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The World
Bank and the G-7:
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Footnotes1 The World Bank Group includes several institutions which provide loans, credit, equity, guarantees and risk insurance for various projects. These institutions include the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), commonly called the World Bank, the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). 2 International Energy
Outlook April 1997, p. 138.
3 The G-7 is a group
of seven of the world's most powerful industrial economies. These
are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. Russia
has become associated with the G-7 this year.
4 "Energy for Rural Areas
and the Urban Poor: A Strategy for Developing Countries," April 1995,
Power Development, Efficiency and Household Fuels Division, Industry
and Energy Dept., World Bank, p. 59.
5 World Bank, World Development
Report 1996.
7 International Energy
Outlook, 1997, p. 138.
8 US Environmental Protection
Agency's Climate Policy Division, conversation with Wiley Barbour,
June 9, 1997, as extrapolated from the Atmospheric Stabilization Framework
model, and from forthcoming paper, "No-Policy Global Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Scenarios: Revisiting the IPCC 1992 Projections," by Wiley
Barbour.
9 Ibid., "Energy for
Rural Areas and the Urban Poor", World Bank, p. 59.
10 "A Shadow Price for
Carbon Emissions in the Energy Portfolio of the World Bank: A Backcasting
Exercise," Terms of Reference. June 27, 1996. p. 3.
12 The World Bank and
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, March 1995, p. 5.
13 See: "The World Bank's
Juggernaut: The Coal-Fired Industrial Colonization of the Indian State
of Orissa," IPS/SEEN, September 1996.
14 The World Bank and
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, March 1995, Environment
Department Paper, pp. 3-4.
15 Letter from Andrew
Steer replying to letter on climate change from Erik Jansson, Department
of the Planet Earth, dated April 15, 1996.
16 The GEF budget for
climate change averting activity is, according to the World Bank,
approximately $450 million; however, much of this money is allocated
to natural gas projects and feasibility studies. Only about $110 million
can truthfully be said to go to projects which avert climate change.
17 This effort, while
laudable, will only reach 1 million out of 115 million rural Indonesians
without access to electricity.
18 World Bank News,
January 30, 1997, "Solar Energy to Light Up Indonesia."
19 For a further critique,
see "The World Bank's Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest: Opportunity
or Liability for the World's Poorest Women," by Nan Dawkins-Scully
and Daphne Wysham, IPS, April 1997.
20 See Energia News
for more information. Or contact: Energia News, c/o TOOL Consult,
Sarphatistraat 650, 1018 AV Amsterdam, The Netherlands. e-mail: toolconsult@tool.nl.
21 See, for example,
Rural Energy and Development: Improving Energy Supplies for Two Billion
People, World Bank, 1996.
22 "The Urgent Need
to Internalize CO2 Emission Costs," R. Goodland and S. El Serafy,
Draft: 9 May, 1997.
23 Congressional testimony
by Lawrence Summers, undersecretary for international affairs, Treasury
Department, March 27, 1995.
24 State of the World
1997, "The Legacy of Rio," by Christopher Flavin, p. 11, 1997, Norton.
25 Carbon is theoretically
given a shadow price of anywhere from $5 to $150 per ton. However,
some World Bank economists claim that the shadow price--or the true
cost to the environment from carbon emissions, which is now externalized--would
fall somewhere between $5 and $40, and is conservatively estimated
to cost around $20 per ton.
26 Chevron is adept
at operating during military crises. Take the case of Somalia: Conoco
and three other G-7 transnationals (Amoco, Chevron and Phillips) were
granted concessions to two-thirds of Somalia's territory for oil and
gas exploration and production the final years of Siad Barre's government.
As the U.S. Marines arrived in Mogadishu, Conoco's embassy became
a de facto U.S. embassy. It served as the government's official "facilitator"
during the intervention.
"They sent all the wrong signals when [U.S. envoy Robert] Oakley moved into the Conoco compound," an unnamed Somalia expert told the Los Angeles Times in January 1993. "It's left everyone thinking the big question here isn't famine relief but oil -- whether the oil concessions granted under Siad Barre will be transferred if and when peace is restored," the expert said. "It's potentially worth billions of dollars, and believe me, that's what the whole game is starting to look like." An unnamed Conoco executive denied the implication that there was a quid pro quo for the use of their headquarters. "With America, there is a genuine humanitarian streak in us... that many other countries and cultures cannot understand," he said. (Los Angeles Times, January 18, 1993) 27 For a detailed report
on Shell's activities in Nigeria and worldwide, see "Independent Annual
Report" on Shell, by Rainforest Action Network, Project Underground
and Oilwatch. Copies may be ordered for $9 from Project Underground,
1847 Berkeley Way, Berkeley, California 94703 project_underground@moles.org.
A collaborative study authored by the Sustainable
Energy andEconomy Network (Institute for Policy Studies, U.S.)
and the International Trade Information
Service (U.S.), in association with Halifax Initiative (Canada),
and Reform the World Bank Campaign (Italy).
Last modified: Mon Jun 23 13:02:23 MET DST 1997
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