Enron Teaches Tough lessons for Developing
World
Praful Bidwai - TNI Fellow
IPS, 7 February 2002
As the Enron scandal sends wave after shock wave through the American
political system, the international repercussions of history's most
spectacular case of corporate bankruptcy are just surfacing.
NEW DELHI, Feb 7 (IPS) - As the Enron scandal sends wave after
shock wave through the American political system, the international
repercussions of history's most spectacular case of corporate bankruptcy
are just surfacing.
Enron has become an abusive transitive verb in the United States,
where some 15 committees are investigating the sleazy political
connections and the energy deregulation policies that allowed the
"New Economy" company to stage a meteoric rise.
Many of the 250-plus senators and congressmen (half the total),
who received Enron's "donations", are returning them to
save themselves from further opprobrium.
But in the Third World, Enron faces very little opprobrium, even
embarrassment. In India, where it has the largest direct investment
in an overseas industrial project, the corporation continues to
make bullying and threatening moves.
It is trying to drag the government of India's Maharashtra state
into international arbitration over the termination of a power purchase
contract signed with its subsidiary, Dabhol Power Company, rather
than submit itself to Indian jurisdiction.
The controversial contract for extremely expensive electricity
was suspended six months ago by the Maharashtra power board, which
nearly went bankrupt as a result of high power prices. As reported
earlier, the deal was reached through shadowy, secret negotiations,
and in violation of the Electricity Supply Act.
Enron is also getting Washington to plead its case. Deputy Treasury
Secretary Kenneth Dam, who is visiting India at present, has told
New Delhi to resolve the Enron issue speedily and speed up economic
reforms.
On Jan. 28, Ambassador Robert Blackwill made a forceful intervention
at an industry meeting, saying that all foreign investment into
India hinges upon a favourable resolution of the Dabhol company
dispute, which "feeds a chronic perception among the overseas
investing community that India may not be ready yet for big-time
international investment".
Blackwill demanded adherence to the "sanctity of contract",
doubts about which can "spell death to potential investors".
This "arrogant" statement left many industrialists angry
and inspired Blackwill's redescription as the "Viceroy",
the British Crown's all-powerful representative in India during
the colonial period who towered over domestic subjects.
Blackwill may only be voicing the views of the Republican Administration:
After all, U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham defends energy
deregulation in spite of Enron's collapse and the bankruptcy of
PG&E, the United States' largest power distribution company.
In a Jan. 14 'Washington Post' he claimed, "Deregulation is
Working".
Blackwill's remarks were indicative of U.S. support for Enron's
effort to get as much as 2.3 billion dollars for its 65 percent
stake in Dabhol Power Company. Market analysts evaluate it at less
than half that figure.
Successive U.S. administrations have heavily lobbied on Enron's
behalf. Vice President Dick Cheney, himself a former energy company
boss, has been in the forefront here.
This policy is rationalised by the White House. Its spokesperson
Ari Fleischer recently said: "It's not uncommon for (companies)
to have exposures, which do require contacts between American officials
and government officials in other countries`."
In 1995, President Bill Clinton sent an official memorandum to
the White House chief of staff, helping Enron clinch the Dabhol
deal that was then being resisted by the New Delhi government.
The U.S. energy secretary had publicly warned India: "Failure
to honour the agreements between the project partners and the various
Indian governments will jeopardise not only the Dabhol project but
also most, if not all, of the other private power projects proposed
for international financing."
The threat worked.
More recently, said 'The Washington Post', the National Security
Council reduced itself to a "concierge service" between
Enron's Kenneth Lay and India's National Security Adviser Brajesh
Mishra.
Normally, these disclosures would have sparked a sharp political
riposte in India, especially from opposition parties like Sonia
Gandhi's Congress. But their response has been supine. This is so
in part because Cheney had "spoken to" Gandhi and Manmohan
Singh during their U.S. visit in June.
However, pressure to liquidate or nationalise Dabhol Power Company
is likely to build up in India as the Enron investigation proceeds
apace in the United States.
There are three general, and three specific, lessons in the Enron
story for the developing countries.
First, it is absolutely vital to fight off hegemonic pressures
on behalf of multinational corporations.
Without such pressure, the highly unequal contract between Dabhol
Power and the Maharashtra government would not have been signed
in 1995. The central government of India would not have given sovereign
guarantees to the project.
The various Indian agencies could have resisted such pressure by
developing arguments about competitiveness, efficiency and the logic
of the market. They failed to do so.
A second lesson is developing countries should ignore all hype
and hoopla about the "New Economy", which make it appear
as if corporations belonging to that sector follow rationales different
from those of the Old Economy, and that they are not motivated by
profits.
The third general lesson for the developing countries is that private
investment looking for quick returns cannot be the favoured instrument
for building core infrastructure such as roads and telecommunications.
In fact, in the developed countries themselves, such activities
have typically been financed directly by governments or through
state-guaranteed low-interest bonds. This is true not only of Western
Europe, but also of the United States. Western power utilities were
built at low rates of return, such as two or three percent.
By contrast, private companies look for quick paybacks and high
rates of return such as 16 percent or more. In the Dabhol company's
case, the rate was a complete rip-off, varying from 31 to 52 percent.
Professor AKN Reddy of the International Energy Initiative has
drawn many specific lessons for the energy sector.
The first, he says, is that it must not be deregulated. Deregulation
has proved disastrous in California, whose biggest power producer,
and distributor, has become unviable.
In India too, deregulation of electricity in states like Orissa
has led to skyrocketing prices, coupled with low supply reliability.
The second lesson is that the energy industry's emphasis must shift
from supply to demand, with a clear focus on rational use of energy
services. This approach privileges users' groups and ordinary people
-- not corporations.
The final lesson is that no contract should be signed without full
transparency, including open tenders, competitive bidding, and credible
evaluation of bids.
Efforts to rush deals on the ground that "no power is more
expensive than no power" will always produce terrible distortions.
Copyright 2002 Inter Press Service
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